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In this letter we present the first implementation of a quantum coin tossing protocol. This protocol
belongs to a class of “two-party” cryptographic problems, where the communication partners distrust
each other. As with a number of such two-party protocols, the best implementation of the quantum
coin tossing requires qutrits. In this way, we have also performed the first complete quantum
communication protocol with qutrits. In our experiment the two partners succeeded to remotely
toss a row of coins using photons entangled in the orbital angular momentum. We also show the
experimental bounds of a possible cheater and the ways of detecting him.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.65.Lm
In the original “coin tossing” protocol, Alice and Bob
had just divorced and didn’t want to ever see each other
again but they had to decide who kept the dog [1]. As
they didn’t trust any third party as a referee, they agreed
to toss a coin to decide. How could, let’s say, Bob be
sure, that Alice is honest when she said ”It was tails...
you lost” if he could not see the outcome of the toss?.
This simple protocol is at the heart of other more com-
plicated cryptographic problems, like mail certification,
remote contract signing and mental poker. Also, this pro-
tocol belongs to a set of cryptographic problems where we
don’t distrust a third party who can eavesdrop our secret,
but the problem is to control the information that the
two communication partners share. This set of protocols
are usually called “post cold war” protocols [2]. Other
examples of this kind of problems are the “bit commit-
ment” protocol or the computation of a function where
the inputs are distributed.
In the last years this kind of protocols have received a
lot of attention from both the cryptographic and quan-
tum information communities. Although the perfect se-
curity of some of the “two-party” protocols seems im-
possible [3, 4, 5], it is yet unclear which bounds can be
imposed on the security. There have been also some spec-
ulation about the possibility that quantum mechanics
can be derived only from purely quantum information
postulates, stating the possibility and impossibility of,
respectively, quantum key distribution and quantum bit
commitment [6].
In the case of “coin tossing”, a set of solutions to this
problem works in the following way: Alice throws the
coin, locks it in a “box” and sends it to Bob. Bob has
the proof that the coin was thrown, but cannot see the
actual result. Bob makes his bet and, upon receiving
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his bet, Alice sends the key to Bob, so that he is able
to unlock the result [7]. Up to now, there is no proof
that the “boxes” used in the classical implementations of
this protocol (for example, one-way functions), are truly
impossible to unlock by Bob, or cannot be modified by
Alice (see Fig. 1(a)). In general, there is no classical pro-
tocol which allows unrestricted security against cheating
for the “coin tossing” protocols. On the other hand, us-
ing quantum mechanics, it is possible to at least limit the
ability of any party to cheat.
In quantum coin tossing [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], we replace
the “box” by a quantum state. Alice chooses one among
a series of non-orthogonal states and sends it to Bob.
Each of the states encodes the result of the throw of the
coin. In this way, without previous knowledge, Bob can-
not know with certainty which of the states he possesses.
At this point, Bob makes his bet. To “unlock” the state,
Alice only has to tell Bob which was the state she sent
and then he can measure it in an orthogonal basis to
check that Alice is honest. If Bob’s measurement cor-
responds with Alice’s predicted state, the protocol is a
success. Otherwise, Alice and Bob would consider the
throw as a “failure” and would disregard it. This coin
tossing scheme limits the probability of a cheater to suc-
ceed. We will show that, in reality, cheating is actually
detected when the “failures” in a row of throws increase
over the statistical errors.
Our implemented protocol is based on a proposal
by Ambainis [8] which uses three-dimensional quantum
states (also called “qutrits”). Up to now, all the devised
protocols using qubits allow a theoretical higher proba-
bility for the cheater to win [13]. In this sense the pro-
tocols using qutrits are better suited for this particular
problem. This raises an interesting question about which
other problems can also be more efficiently solved with
higher dimensional states [14].
The series of states that Alice can send and the corre-
spondent throw of the coin are presented in Table 1 [15].
Alice’s states are divided into two sets, each of them con-
taining two orthogonal states. States of one set have a
2Set Label Alice’s States Coin Bob’s Bases Label
1 A11 (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 Heads (1)
(|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 B11
(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 B12
1 A12 (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 Heads (1) |2〉 B13
2 A21 (|0〉+ |2〉)/√2 Tails (0)
(|0〉 + |2〉)/√2 B21
(|0〉 − |2〉)/√2 B22
2 A22 (|0〉 − |2〉)/√2 Tails (0) |1〉 B23
TABLE I: Here we show the four different states sent by Alice
and the bases used by Bob to properly characterize the incom-
ing photon. The Alice’s states are divided into two sets of two
states. Each set represents a particular side of the coin. Bob
uses two basis, corresponding to Alice’s states, each expanded
by one further orthogonal state. The label of the states eases
their recognition in Fig. 1
non-vanishing projection onto states of the other set. For
this reason, Bob needs two different measuring bases in
order to determine the state of each possible photon sent
by Alice. In Table 1, we also show the elements of Bob’s
bases associated with each set. Note that every basis
contains, besides the states of the corresponding set, a
third state orthogonal to them, which in our case is ei-
ther |2〉 (set 1) or |1〉 (set 2). These additional states are
crucial for increasing the chances to detect cheating, as
we will show below. Ambainis [8] demonstrated that the
maximum probability that one of the partners biases the
result without being noticed is 25%. Remember that, in
any coin tossing, each party needs to cheat only in 50%
of the throws, because that’s the probability of losing,
which limits the theoretical probability of a cheater to
win to 75%.
In our experiment Alice and Bob agreed to build the
following set-up to implement the protocol (See Fig.
1(b)). Alice possess a source of orbital angular momen-
tum entangled photons [16, 17]. She keeps one photon
of the pair and sends the other one to Bob. When she
projects her photon onto one of the four states in Tab.
1 and detects it, she knows that she is sending to Bob a
triggered photon [18] carrying an orbital angular momen-
tum qutrit. Together with the photon, she sends a signal
to Bob, telling him that a coin has been thrown and so,
the corresponding entangled photon with the right state
is being sent to him. Once Bob receives the signal, he
sends his bet to Alice. Now she can tell Bob which was
the state. Using this information, Bob can measure the
state of the photon and verify the honesty of Alice.
The set-up consists of a 351nm wavelength Argon-ion
laser pumping a 1.5−mm-thick BBO (β-barium-borate)
crystal cut for Type I phase matching condition. The
crystal is positioned such as to produce down-converted
pairs of identically polarized photons at a wavelength of
702nm emitted at an angle of 4◦ off the pump direction.
These photons are directly entangled in the orbital an-
gular momentum degree of freedom. One of the photons
is sent to Bob, meanwhile the other remains on Alice’s
side. With a series of beam-splitters, whose reflectances
were chosen so that the photons were equally distributed
among the different paths, both parties direct their pho-
tons probabilistically to a series of holograms and single
mode fibers, prepared to project the photon onto a cer-
tain state [19]. Alice’s and Bob’s states are presented in
Table 1.
Bob’s measurements were performed in the following
way: Bob’s photons were directed randomly to a pro-
jection onto one of the six possible states. The photons
going to the wrong basis were discarded.
Once the set-up was built, Alice and Bob decided to try
their coin-tossing protocol with a row of throws. In this
experiment they obtained 50% heads (1) and 44% tails
(0). As Bob’s guesses were random, he won in half of the
throws. The overall failures in the protocol represented
around 6% of the throws, intrinsic to the setup. In Fig. 2
(a)-(b) we present the experimental probabilities of Bob’s
measurements, for two different states sent by Alice.
In Fig. 3(a), we show a set of the actual throws. Every
square of the image represents a throw of the coin. The
color of every square represents the result of the throw,
as Alice communicates it to Bob (black is tails, white is
heads). Red (gray) means that the throw was a failure.
In order to explore the limits of the implementation
Alice decided to cheat Bob. We want to remark that it
is a harder problem to devise a cheating procedure, than
to prepare the honest protocol. In our case, the best
way we could find for Alice to cheat was the following
one. Alice always sends a random symmetric mixture
of the state (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 and the state (|0〉 + |2〉)/√2,
which is a random mixture of being heads or tails [20].
When Bob makes his bet about the state, Alice always
tells him that he lost, and then, Bob has to measure in
the corresponding basis. For example, if Bob says that
it was tails, Alice’s answer is that the state was heads
((|0〉 − |1〉)/√2), and Bob measures in this basis. It is
an easy task to check that Alice will win in 63.5% of the
throws, which is below the theoretical maximum of 75%
[8, 13]. This strategy resembles a biased coin which can
be flipped even after Bob made his choice.
In order to force Alice to cheat, we changed states A12
and A21 to be identical to states number A22 and A11,
respectively. Alice does not need to keep a record of
which state is being sent. In this way she sends a prob-
abilistic mixture of the two states, which represent cor-
respondingly heads and tails. Her strategy is to tell Bob
that the state sent was exactly the opposite of Bob’s bet.
In the experimental implementation, of course, it is
3even harder for Alice to win, because she cannot turn off
the statistical errors which also happen in the honest pro-
tocol. In our case, we found that the number of failures,
when Alice cheats in this way, was a 46% of the throws.
In Fig. 2 (c)-(d), one can check Bob’s results for the two
different states that Alice claimed she was sending. Also,
we present the actual row of throws in Fig. 3(b), with
the same coding colors than Fig. 3(a). In this case, by
comparing the results presented in images (a) and (b) it
was very easy for Bob to discover that in (b) the protocol
was not followed in the honest way. Also, it was a little
bit suspicious to him that in all the proper throws of Fig.
3(b), Alice won.
At this point, let us turn back to Fig. 2(c)-(d). We
want to note that the state in which most of the failures
go is precisely the one which is outside the plane defined
by the elements of Alice’s set. It is unclear whether other
cheating procedures would give rise to the same result
but, at least in this case, the use of a three dimensional
space is necessary in order that Bob can detect Alice
cheating.
Once the subject was clarified between Alice and Bob,
he decided to build a table where he could infer the
amount of dishonest throws, given the number of failures
during the protocol (Fig. 3(c)).
Before finishing, we would like to discuss a few details
from this particular implementation. In a proper proto-
col, the detection of the photon by Bob should be delayed
until he can send his bet to Alice. In our set-up, it was
very difficult to prepare such a delay and so, we simulated
it by software. A more realistic implementation should
include an optical delay with, for example, a couple of
parallel mirrors.
Another difference with respect to an ideal implemen-
tation is that both Alice and Bob could not determinis-
tically project their photon onto a given state. Although
it is clear that this is not a problem for an honest Alice,
who chooses at random which state to send among the
possible four, it might present a security hazard when
one of the parties cannot be trusted. A closer look to the
set-up shows that this is not the case.
If Bob’s photon goes to the wrong projection, Bob just
loses the photon and has to ask Alice to send it again.
Alice cannot take profit of this effect, because she never
knows whether the photon she sends is going to the right
projection or not.
On the other hand, Bob could try to use this proba-
bilistic behavior in his favor, just by not acknowledging
a right measurement of a lost bet. But then Alice would
notice an abnormal increase of lost photons and would
stop the communication, in the same way as an increase
of “failures” would be the trademark of a cheater.
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated a
“quantum coin tossing” protocol. To our knowledge, this
is the first “two-party” communication protocol which is
solved using the laws of quantum physics to encode the
communication. It is worth mentioning that, contrary to
the usual “key distribution” protocols, in this case the
information shared by Alice and Bob is truly exchanged
through the quantum states. Also, this protocol is the
first to be implemented, where the use of more than two
dimensions presents a clear advantage. Using our set-up
we could share a set of a few tens of thousand coin throws
in a few seconds among two parties. We also allowed one
party to try to cheat, which could be easily detected by
a significant increase of “failures”. We could not find
an optimal cheating procedure, but we hope that this
work triggers others, where the possibilities of realistic
dishonest parties are studied.
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FIG. 1: a) Sketch of the implemented “coin tossing” protocol:
First step, Alice throws a coin, encodes it in a quantum state
and sends it to Bob. Second step, Bob’s sends his bet to
Alice. Third step, Alice tells Bob which state it was and Bob
unlocks the result by measuring the state. b) Diagram of the
set-up used. Alice possesses a source of entangled photons.
Using beamsplitters, she projects probabilistically one of the
photons onto one of the four possible states shown in Table 1.
This state is transferred nonlocally to the other photon, which
is on its way to Bob. Bob’s photon is projected randomly onto
one of the six possible elements of the two bases. Photons
going to a wrong basis are not considered.
FIG. 2: Statistics of Bob’s measurements. Red (gray) bars
correspond to “failures” of the protocol. Black (heads) and
white (tails) bars correspond to proper throws and indicate
the result of the tossing. (a)-(b) Alice is honest. We present
only two of the possible four states sent by Alice: (a) she
sends the state |0〉 + |1〉)/√2 (Heads) and (b) she sends the
state |0〉 − |2〉)/√2 (Tails). The errors in this case are due
to misalignments of the set-up and are intrinsic to it. (c)-(d)
Alice is cheating. She always sends a mixture of two states.
After Bob makes his bet, she decides which state she must
tell him: (c) she claims to send state |0〉 − |1〉)/√2, (d) she
claims to send state |0〉+ |2〉)/√2. In this case, the errors are
clear indicators of the presence of a cheater. The difference
of the errors of cases (c) and (d) are mainly due to the fact
that Alice is not sending a perfect mixture of the two states.
FIG. 3: (a)-(b) Two different ordered rows of throws. Upper
left corner: first throw, lower right corner: last throw. Color
code as in Fig. 2, Black: head, White: tail and Red (gray):
“Failure”. (a) Bob and Alice are honest: Heads 50%, tails
44%, failures 6%. The difference between heads and tails due
to different efficiencies of the detectors and the failures due
to imperfections of the set-up. (b) Bob honest, Alice cheats.
Heads 26%, tails 28%, failures 46%. One can clearly see how
the failures increase due to the fact that Alice is cheating. (c)
Probability of failure as a function of the amount of cheating
by Alice. Solid line: theory. Circles: Experimental data.
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